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Abstract. This paper examines the structure of Twitter communication networks betweenMPs during the 2016 EU Referendum7
campaign. In particular, the research examines the impact of Twitter in two dimensions: (1) how far social media might facilitate8
inter-party linkages thus eroding traditional partisan relations between MPs? This was given added potential by the supposedly9
cross-party nature of the Referendum campaign and, therefore, we specifically examined the collective communicative networks10
that formed around Leave and Remain amongst MPs; (2) Given the potential of social media to provide a platform for individual11
politicians to personalize campaigns, we asked how far social media might disrupt traditional formal intra-party hierarchies?12
Did, for example, backbench or relatively unknown figures come to the fore in the EU debate? Our results indicate that whilst13
there existed a high degree of partisanship, interestingly, Remainer MPs tended to adhere to party networks resulting in a divided14
remain network. By contrast, the Leave network was more unified but also more porous. Within the networks themselves, the15
centrality of individual MPs did not always reflect their formal status.16
Keywords: EU Referenda, MP networks, Twitter, inter-party, intra-party17
18
Key points for practitioners:19
– Methodologically, social media network analysis provides us with window on politicians’ interpersonal networks that20
would previously have been difficult to access.21
– Our findings have implications for campaigners in referenda. The results here found that partisanship trumped remain22
in terms of the overall remain campaign. This produced a divided remain network with potentially damaging results for23
clarity of the campaign.24
– Social media technologies are disrupting traditional party and parliamentary hierarchies by allowing greater focus on25
personalities and individuals beyond just traditional party office holders.26
1. Introduction27
In the UK, as in many democracies, there has been a rapid rise of MPs using Twitter over the past28
decade. From being a relative novelty in 2010, over one parliamentary cycle, the technology had been29
normalized by 2016 with 576MPs having Twitter accounts by the time of the EU referendum (McLough-30
lin, 2016). Research in this area has tended to focus on the use of technology for representative and31
1An early version of this paper entitled: ‘MPs, Twitter and the EU Referendum Campaign’ by the same authors was presented
at the Elections, Parties and Opinion Polls (EPOP) Conference, University of Kent, 8–10th September 2016.
⇤Corresponding author: Stephen Ward, School of Arts and Media, Crescent House, University of Salford, Salford, M5 4WT,
UK. Tel.: +44 161 295 2803; E-mail s.j.ward@salford.ac.uk.
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participatory purposes, political marketing and campaigning, or more broadly on changes in style of rep-32
resentative democracy (Jackson & Lilleker, 2011; Margolis & Moreno-Riano, 2013; Kruikmeier, 2014).33
However, far less attention has been devoted to the arguably less high-profile world either issue-based34
discussion or communication networks between political representatives. This is despite some evidence35
of the use of platforms such as Twitter for discussions with other political representatives (Sæbø, 2011).36
Thus, this research starts to approach communication from this perspective. This is through an analy-37
sis of the communicative networks being fostered by social media between MPs and what this means38
for campaigns and behaviour within and between parliamentary parties. In particular, we are interested39
in examining how far social media are, or are not, challenging both inter and intra-party relationships.40
Whilst there has been much popular comment on the disruptive nature of technologies (Margetts et al.,41
2015), much of the existing empirical research suggests a more conservative approach in the politi-42
cal/parliamentary sphere. Some studies suggest far from challenging political representatives’ behaviour43
or power structures and elites within parties – online campaigning has hardened divides both between44
parties (Gibson & Ward, 2009, 2012; Margolis & Resnick, 2001). However, more recent work has sug-45
gested that social media may be challenging traditional power structures in terms of who dominates46
campaigns (Jackson & Lilleker, 2010; Schweitzer, 2011; Gibson, 2013; Southern, 2015; Southern &47
Lee, 2019) with more decentralised and open formats.48
Our research examines these broad questions within the more specific context of MPs’ online networks49
during the UK EU referendum debate. The referendum arguably offered rare opportunities for cross-50
party linkages, with MPs able to explain publicly their own individual (as opposed to a party), position51
on Britain’s relationship with the EU stance as well as a chance for a sustained national discussion/debate52
focused around a single issue. This makes it an ideal case-study with which to examine the erosion of53
barriers to inter-party politics in public political discourse online.54
2. Literature review55
The rapid growth of platforms such as Twitter across many democracies has prompted considerable56
interest about the meaning of social media networks might and whether they provide any other than57
a superficial representation of relationships between individuals, groups and organisations (Sandoval-58
Almazan and Valle-De Cruz, 2018). In the political sphere, debates have concentrated on to how far59
social media might enhance, erode, or disrupt democratic relationships and institutions (Effing et al.,60
2011). The research here focuses some of these general concerns into the more specific context of par-61
liamentary party networking around a contentious issue (Brexit) to assess whether social media might62
disrupt tradition partisan networks both between and within, political parties.63
2.1. Inter-party politics: Is the Internet eroding party barriers?64
The internet and social media are often seen as reducing the costs of networking and linkages es-65
pecially given their relative ease of use and lack of editorial controls (Lassen & Brown, 2010). In a66
parliamentary context, one expectation when social media first emerged was that technologies would67
allow different types of relationships to develop such as allowing ordinary backbenchers to challenge68
government ministers more effectively or reflecting institutional relationships across parties. For ex-69
ample, connecting MPs on the same parliamentary committees more effectively and allowing them to70
call for shared policies or measures across party lines (Lusoli & Ward, 2005). Theoretically, at least,71
social media could support an erosion of traditional partisan relationships in favour of more open and72
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mixed networks between representatives, eroding partisanship rather than entrenching it. Whilst this73
argument might have technological potential, it underestimates the resilience of traditional partisan po-74
litical networks and the strength of parliamentary party discipline in many parliaments. For instance, one75
Norwegian study found there was little identifiable desire to move away from party attachments (Enli &76
Skogerbø, 2013). Indeed, what this theory perhaps underplays is that technology is often reflective of the77
institutional and political environment within which it operates (Leston-Bandeira, 2007). Furthermore,78
even if technology reduces the costs of networking the effect would not be evenly distributed. Hence,79
the internet and social media are arguably most effective at helping sustain like-minded networks. This80
has been referred to as the homophily or ‘birds of feather flock together’ argument (Granovetter, 1983)81
whereby individuals gravitate towards networks with people of similar interests (McPherson et al., 2001;82
Larsson & Ihlen, 2015; Himelboim et al., 2013). This has been then linked to a supposed “echo-chamber”83
effect which potentially strengthens pre-existing opinions, prejudices and polarises debates through se-84
lective exposure (Sunstein, 2006; Bright 2016). There are challenges to these assertions however. Several85
studies found little evidence to support either homophily or echo chambers in social media networks.86
Barbera (2015) and Gil de Zúñiga and Valenzuela (2011) found many cases of Twitter users coming87
into contact with more diverse opinions that ones that simply supported their existing views and DuBois88
and Blank (2018) found that varied online media diets increased the chance of one being in a network89
whereby one would come across views one might disagree with via incidental or accidental exposure90
(Valeriani & Vaccari, 2016; Fletcher & Nielson, 2018).91
The limited empirical evidence on parliamentary social media networks, however, tends to bear the92
homophily assertion out. Although Miller (2015) found some evidence for cross party connections form-93
ing in the UK, research indicate that social media networks are highly reflective of their political sys-94
tems and party environments (Gibson & Ward, 2009, 2012; Thamm & Bleier, 2013; Hsu & Park, 2012;95
Rauchfleisch & Metag 2016). Hence, in adversarial party systems like the UK, with a relatively limited96
numbers of parliamentary parties, social media networks between MPs seemingly mirror offline polar-97
ization (NESTA, 2015). In short, MPs unsurprisingly, tend to network most closely with their own party.98
The picture is marginally different in federal multi-party systems where there is more of a culture of co-99
operation and coalition more and, therefore, more social media cross-over between MPs (Nevertheless,100
though, there remains limited study of parliamentary networking via social media platforms especially101
around specific issues or debates.102
2.2. Intra-party politics: Is social media eroding hierarchies?103
Even if social media doesn’t break down party boundaries, one could suggest that social media could104
facilitate challenges to intra-party politics (Gibson & Ward, 2009, 2012; Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). It105
has been argued that new technologies could erode traditional party and parliamentary hierarchies by106
encouraging decentralist and individualistic tendencies (Karvonen, 2010; van Aelst et al., 2012). One107
argument is that social media and the internet generally allow individual MPs a more open and level108
communication playing field than they would get through, say, the traditional media. In most western109
democracies, studies indicate that newspaper and broadcast media have increasingly narrowed their fo-110
cused on a handful of politicians and leading ministers with backbench parliamentarians receiving less111
and less coverage (Negrine, 1999; Negrine & Lilliker, 2003; Tresch 2009; Deacon & Wring, 2011).112
However, the internet offers ordinary MPs a low-cost mechanism of communication not controlled by113
editors or other media gatekeepers. Whilst party elites still have the advantage of traditional media cov-114
erage, the internet world could at least allow, if not a levelling, a widening of the this sphere, permitting115
Galley Proof 27/09/2019; 10:50 File: ip–1-ip190140.tex; BOKCTP/xjm p. 4
4 L. McLoughlin et al. / A tale of three tribes: UK MPs, Twitter and the EU Referendum campaign
MPs to become known for a particular cause or centre themselves within a network without needing116
the help of traditional journalists in order to do so. A recent study of the Catalan Parliament, for ex-117
ample, detected the growth of online influencers and brokers who drew their strength not from formal118
institutional positions but from their centrality to online networks (Del Valle & Borge, 2017). One early119
example of this in the UK would be the way that Tom Watson, now Labour’s Deputy Leader but that the120
time a relative unknown, harnessed social media to make a name for himself around regulation of the121
press and subsequently as one of the key proponents of the Leveson Reforms (Francoli & Ward, 2008).122
Social media could allow other relatively junior MPs a platform by which to stand out in a way that123
might have been difficult without them. Several UK backbench MPs have attained prominence online124
and used social media to campaign effectively. For example, Stella Creasy in her campaign against legal125
loan sharks (Binns, 2018) and, more recently, David Lammy in his campaigns on Grenfell tragedy and126
the Windrush deportation scandal (Lo Dico, 2018). In addition to offering this greater general commu-127
nication presence, social media also allows MPs a greater opportunity to personalise party messages,128
make their own opinions heard and explain their own policy/issue stance which may diverge from the129
party line. Hence, social media could accelerate tendencies toward personalisation and individualization130
of politics detected since the 1980s (Kruikemeier, 2014).131
Interrelated to presence and personalisation is the notion that social media platforms allow MPs to132
express dissent more easily and to challenge party leaderships (Gibson & Ward, 2018). Given the ease,133
speed, and low costs of communication now available, it has become increasingly difficult for parties to134
control communication flows despite the apparent growth in leadership resources in many parties since135
the 1980s. Certainly, there are indications that social media is increasingly disrupting traditional UK136
party politics and making it less predictable. Jeremy Corbyn’s rapid rise to Labour leadership from an137
outsider position has been attributed in part to support inflated by Twitter/social media networks (Prince,138
2016; Gilbert, 2015). Whether the rise of some outsider or populist politicians represents decentralist or139
democratization of parties is more debatable. One could of course argue that newmedia environments are140
simply accelerating the trend towards an increase in new forms of elite politicians through the promotion141
of personality traits or celebrity-style charisma (Van Zoonen, 2005). However, it is a question that is142
unlikely to disappear particularly as social media has seemed to contribute to the stratospheric rise of143
previously obscure politicians, including the recent examples of Beto O’Rourke and Alexandria Ocasio-144
Cortez in the US (Gallucci, 2018).145
Our case study here can also offer insights on two further literatures. Firstly, our data are a proxy146
in some sense for the unity of the two campaign camps (Leave and Remain). Assessing the communi-147
cation linkages between these camps, which were often made up of members of opposing parties will148
shed some light into how unified networks were, or at least wanted to appear, in their social media cam-149
paigning. Literature on this topic suggests that campaigns can often suffer if there is apparently disunity150
or discord (Norris et al., 1999; Cantor & Hernson, 1997; Simon, 2002). The Twitter campaign data151
employed here can offer an important insight into this aspect of the campaign and could have broader152
implications for campaign strategic communications more broadly. This also offers an opportunity to153
further learn about whether partisanship endures in free votes. This is usually something studies within154
the context of parliamentary votes but this case offers an important insight into this question outside of155
the voting chamber. Work in this area suggests that partisanship is highly cohesive even when votes are156
not whipped. Cowley and Stuart (1997: 1) assessed free votes between 1979 and 1996 and found a high157
level of voting along party lines even when the ‘whips were off’. Even on issues of conscience, which158
are often unwhipped as such matters are seen as being above party, Cowley (1998) found high degrees159
of partisanship. The EU referendum was deemed a free vote for both main parties being considered as an160
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issue that cut across parties also. Assessing partisanship in this campaign will, therefore, offer important161
new insights into the entrenchment of partisanship outside of the confines of the voting chamber, which162
may still remind MPs of their party allegiances.163
2.3. The EU Referendum as a case study for exploring the erosion of inter-party barriers and164
intra-party hierarchies165
The 2016 Referendum debate offered a useful opportunity to look afresh at some of the potentially dis-166
ruptive challenges of new technologies. As discussed, much of the empirical research thus far suggested167
a relatively conservative approach to technologies by MPs and parties and limited impact in highly tra-168
ditional political sphere. The EU referendum presented a good test case for a number of reasons: Firstly,169
this was a focused debate that crossed party boundaries and divided parties (the Conservatives especially,170
although some prominent Labour figures were also pro-Leave, against the prevailing Party line).2 The171
campaign was in theory cross-party, offering a chance for new networks to be created not simply based172
on party linkages/ideology. Moreover, the referendum debate, given that it divided parties, also risked173
heightening internal divides. Furthermore, whilst campaigns were led by well-known leading politicians,174
the social media world potentially allowed other voices to be heard and for MPs more generally to clearly175
state their own individual personal positions.176
3. Research questions and methodology177
With the above discussion in mind, therefore, we focussed on the following questions:178
(1) From the inter-party perspective – was social media helping foster cross party networking during179
the campaign? More specifically, was partisanship or policy (i.e. Leave/Remain) stronger in the180
formation of elite communication networks on social media during the EU referendum campaign?181
(2) In terms of the intra-party arena – was social media facilitating the erosion of traditional party182
and institutional hierarchies by allowing backbenchers to gain greater prominence and centrality183
within intra-MP campaign discourse?184
3.1. Operationalising the research questions and collecting the data185
Traditionally, researching the ways political representatives communicate between themselves is a186
difficult challenge. Permission to access the behind the scenes communication from in person, letter, or187
email would be complicated, and the ethical considerations would be significant. However, with MPs188
uptake of social media, a glimpse of their interpersonal communication now takes place online in a way189
that is accessible and open to examination. Assessing these communications can provide insights into190
the networks at play during the campaign, and the prominence of MPs within these camps. To do this,191
we took interactions between MPs on Twitter. This provides us with a novel method for understanding192
the network of communication that occurs between elites and the patterns we see within them. This is an193
aspect of campaigning that is hitherto under researched, largely due to the difficulty of acquiring reliable194
information on communication between elites. Twitter was used as a basis for study due the relative195
2Kate Hoey, Gisela Stuart, Frank Field, Kelvin Hopkins and Graham Stringer being the most prominent Labour Leavers.
Galley Proof 27/09/2019; 10:50 File: ip–1-ip190140.tex; BOKCTP/xjm p. 6
6 L. McLoughlin et al. / A tale of three tribes: UK MPs, Twitter and the EU Referendum campaign
Table 1
Total number of Tweets by party
Party MPs in MPs in filtered Number of Tweets Tweets EU Tweets EU
sample data by MPs related related (%)
Conservative 275 152 2,828 906 32.0
Labour 210 148 4,353 862 19.8
Green 1 1 25 8 32.0
DUP 7 0 39 0 0.0
Liberal democrat 8 4 129 18 14.0
Plaid Cymru 3 2 42 6 14.3
SNP 54 32 681 92 13.5
SDLP 3 2 18 4 22.2
Sinn Féin 4 0 5 0 0.0
UKIP 1 1 26 13 50.0
UUP 2 0 3 0 0.0
Total 568 342 8,149 1,909 23.4
openness of data collection due to its streaming API3 and as it has become the main type of social media196
used by MPs to communicate publicly (Southern & Lee, 2018).197
For this research, we collected every message sent between MPs on Twitter during the official EU198
referendum campaign (15th April to 23rd June 2016). To do this, we identified all MPs with a Twitter ac-199
count and added their Twitter handles to a database. To ensure that no fake profiles entered the database,200
each MPs handle was confirmed through Twitter’s verified status service and via their biography on201
Parliament.uk. Through this process, we found that 576 out of 650 MPs had a Twitter account.202
The dataset on MPs handles was applied to a data acquisition software that integrates with Twitter’s203
streaming API called NodeXL. This collected all the Tweets, Retweets, Replies andMentions (referred to204
as actions in this paper (Smith et al., 2010)) between all MPs over the course of the data collection period.205
During the data collection period eight MPs made no communication on Twitter and are therefore not206
included in the dataset. This produced a dataset of 8,149 actions, which we believe represents the entirety207
of all communication between MPs on Twitter during the referendum campaign. From the collected208
data of 8,149 actions between MPs, the majority came from mentions (6,681), while 1,244 came from209
tweets, and replies only made up 224 of the total. Furthermore, the dataset, which comprises follower210
relationships between MPs, includes 51,348 separate connections.211
It must be noted that during the data collection period, there was several events of political importance212
that were exogenous to the research focus. These included, a number of other local elections and most213
notably the murder of Jo Cox MP (a Labour remain supporting MP) by a right wing extremist that214
led to the suspension of the campaign for a few days. These events shaped a significant amount of215
communication between MPs on social media. These were filtered out of our data post-hoc leaving only216
data that directly referenced the EU or the referendum.4 The results of this can be seen in Table 1.217
Network analysis software Gephi (Bastian et al., 2009) was then employed to analyse the data. This218
was used as a visual and numerical method of understanding the groupings that formed within this elite219
interpersonal communication network. Furthermore, we were also able to use Gephi to find which MPs220
had the most importance in the networks and if the online discussions were led by particular MPs.221
3API stands for ‘Application Programming Interface’ – an API is a way for programs and other software to retrieve and
modify data from an external source, bypassing website interfaces. In this instance Twitter allows access to two separate APIs:
the streaming API, and search API. Each allow access to different data and usage of each is selected dependent on requirements.
4Only retained tweets that directly contained words or hashtags relevant to the EU, the referendum campaign, or either
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Fig. 1. Examples of actions between MPs on Twitter. These two images show the types of tweets collected within the dataset.
The first image on the right shows Ben Howlett MP mentioning Sadiq Khan MP. The second tweet on the right shows Damian
Collins MP directly tweeting to George Osborne MP.
3.2. Ethics222
Whenever using data taken from social media, it is important to ensure rigorous ethical standards.223
Therefore, we implemented the ethics frameworks from a number of sources (Markham & Buchanan,224
2012; Salmons & Woodfield, 2013; Beninger, 2014). This includes insuring that the methodology only225
took place from only publicly accessible data. Data from private Twitter accounts were not collected.226
Furthermore, it can be assumed that MPs are public figures and use social media to send messages to a227
public audience, and are not concerned about the messages they post being in the public domain.228
Data was only collected on verified MPs; therefore, no members of the public are part of the data229
set. In accordance with Twitter’s developer agreement and policy agreement (Twitter, 2016), no tweets230
deleted by MPs are published as part of this paper.231
remain or leave campaign hashtags. So tweets containing the words or hashtags EU, referendum, European Union, euro, #EU,
#Referendum, #voteleave, #UKinEU, #brexit, #stayin, #LabourInForBritian, #strongerout.
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Fig. 2. Methodology schema.
4. Findings232
4.1. Understanding network analysis233
The research deployed social network analysis (SNA) to understand communities by visualising them234
as a network. SNA allows researchers to pinpoint social structures, groups, or even key individuals235
within the online sphere (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2011). For this research, a series of network graphs236
was created to visualise the data collected in this research. These network graphs are made up of nodes,237
which symbolise each user in the network, and edges, which show the relationship between the nodes. In238
these graphs, where there are more connections between two nodes, this will be visualised by a relative239
closeness between them on a graph. We have also displayed the importance of each node through size240
using a measure called centrality. Nodes with a higher level of centrality have a more central role within241
the network (Gruzd et al., 2018, p. 728). To demonstrate centrality, we have adjusted the size of each242
mode relative to their importance within the network. Another measure used as part of this research is243
modularity, this is a statistical measure that determines whether densely connected participants in the244
network represent distinct communities or not. This uses the algorithm by Blondel et al. (2008) that is245
available through the Gephi software package.246
4.2. Follower relationships between MPs247
Follower relationships on Twitter are asymmetrical connections between two people that allows the248
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Graph 1. Follower relationships of MPs; nodes coloured by party. Created using Force Atlas 2 Layout. Each MP (displayed as
nodes) has been identified by the party they represent: Blue, Conservative – Red, Labour – Yellow, SNP – Liberal Democrats,
Orange – Grey; Other. The size of the Nodes and Labels are dependent on their importance within the network (Eigenvector).
follower to receive updates of the followee within their social network streams. Takemura et al. (2015)249
sought to understand the significance between a follower and found that there is not one singular reason250
for why one user would choose to follow another. Instead, there are a number of interconnected factors251
that induce follower relationships that include information gathering, as a method of enacting personal252
communication, showing support for the followee, or simply as a method to see what the user is up to.253
Although the reason for an MP to follow another MP is undetermined, followers are a useful method254
of being able to see how the networks of particular set of people are grouped. Furthermore, under-255
standing the network based from follower relationships is a useful method for measuring longstanding256
relationships on Twitter between MPs. As the networks based upon following is more stable than tweets,257
retweets or mentions, which are more dependent on political climates. Consequently, we are able to use258
follower networks to create a baseline perspective of MPs’ networked groups.259
An initial examination of the data looking at the follower relationships suggests that MPs on Twit-260
ter are extremely interconnected. We located 51,348 follower connections between MPs meaning that261
MPs follow on average 90.4 other MPs. However, this differed by party. Conservative and Labour MPs262
followed the most, following 93.6 and 102.1 MPs. Meanwhile MPs from other parties followed other263
MPs significantly less, with SNPMPs and all other party MPs following 60.3 and 31.8 respectively. This264
suggests that MPs will mostly limit who they follow to MPs of their own party, as MPs from the larger265
parties, with the most MPs, would have more colleagues to follow.266
Indeed, SNA analysis goes on to confirm the highly partisan nature of MPs follower relationships in267
the UK. From the total of 51,348 follower connections, only 10,896 (21.2%), of the relationships cross268
party lines. To investigate this relationship, we created Graph 1 which visualises the follower network269
amongst MPs through the use of the Force Atlas 2 Layout. The Force Atlas 2 algorithm works by270
having ‘nodes repulse each other like charged particles, while edges attract their nodes, like springs’,271
this results in a graph that shows the closeness of a network by turning structural proximities into visual272
ones (Jacomy et al., 2014 PAGE). As a result, it displays follower networks on Twitter, with the closer273
nodes (or MPs) showing a stronger networked grouping. Graph 1 shows the overall follower network274
with MPs with each node coded by the MPs respective party. This graph highlights how much closer275
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Graph 2. MPs network of communication based from actions during the referendum campaign coloured by party. Created
using OpenOrd Layout. Each MP (displayed as nodes) has been identified by the party they represent. Blue, Conservative;
Red, Labour; Yellow, SNP; Liberal Democrats, Orange; Grey; Other. The size of the Nodes and Labels are dependent on their
importance within the network (Eigenvector).
MPs from the same party are than with other MPs. This again signifies the highly partisan nature of MPs276
online networks. Although the edges display some cross-party relationships, these are not as significant277
as the relationships between party colleagues. This would suggests that MPs do not tend to follow a278
wide variety of MPs, but are more selective about which MPs they follow on Twitter, with the majority279
of these connections identifiably partisan as they strongly correlate with party affiliation.280
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Table 2
Modularity group displayed by intention to vote and party
Group Number Intention to vote Party
in group Remain Leave Undeclared Labour Conservative SNP Other
Group 1 120 (28.6%) 109 (90.8%) 11 (9.1%) 0 (0%) 20 (16.7%) 96 (80%) 2 (1.67%) 2 (1.67%)
Group 2 153 (36.42%) 85 (55.6%) 66 (43.1%) 2 (1.3%) 36 (23.53%) 81 (52.9%) 27 (17.6%) 9 (5.89%)
Group 3 147 (35%) 133 (90.5%) 13 (8.84%) 1 (0.68%) 116 (78.9%) 22 (14.9%) 5 (3.4%) 4 (2.72%)
Total 420 327 90 3 172 199 34 15
MPs intention to vote data, BBC 2016.
4.3. Communication between MPs during the referendum campaign281
From the data collected, we located 1,909 separate incidences of communication between MPs during282
the referendum campaign. Using these actions for the basis of analysis, we were able to assess overall283
networks during the campaign and the groups in which MPs reside. To test this, we created a series284
of network graphs. Graph 2 displays the network actions by MPs during the campaign. For this, we285
used the OpenOrd layout that is used for distinguishing clusters within a given network (Martin et al.,286
2011). We coloured each node by party membership to test if partisanship remained a prominent factor287
in the make-up of online groups. Analysis of the graph shows three major groups within the network,288
and furthermore, that while there is some correlation between party and the groups, there are significant289
other factors in determining the make-up of the network. This is important, as it has the potential to290
demonstrate that while the normal relationship between MPs is defined by party membership as shown291
by the follower relationship graphs, when focusing on particular issues such as the EU referendum, party292
has less significance in defining areas within the structure of the network.293
To further understand the changes within this network, and to detect the factors that determine the294
membership of the groups within the graph, we undertook analysis through the use of modularity classes.295
We found eight different groups based upon modularity. Five of the groups only contained nine MPs296
between them and therefore are omitted from further analysis due to lack of statistical power. The three297
main groups can be seen in Graph 3, which is a network graph of all actions taken between MPs during298
the campaign, coloured by their respective classes. This shows that each group is closely interlinked, and299
while there is communication between each group, this is not as significant as those within the groups300
themselves. Table 2 outlines the characteristics of each group in terms of group figures, intention to vote301
in the referendum, and party membership. The makeup of each group shows particular characteristics.302
Group 1 is characterised by a high index of Conservatives who wish to remain in the EU. Similarity,303
group 3 is also pro-remain but is largely made up of Labour MPs. Group 2 is significantly different. This304
group has a greater mix of party memberships compared to groups 1 and 3, but much more pro-Leave305
than the two other groups.306
Through further analysis, it was found overall groups 1 and 3 shared a relative commonality of support307
for the Remain campaign, and this can be seen in comparison to group 2 in Graph 3. However, the308
groupings show the deep party political divisions across the Remain campaign, suggesting a less united309
front than perhaps the Remain campaign would have wanted to create. Although MPs in both group 1310
and 3 supported the same cause, party politics remained a centralising factor. Suggesting although MPs311
may support a shared cause, it was not greater than their desire to focus on party communication on312
Twitter.313
Group 2 showed a significant difference in overall composition, its membership was less defined314
by party, and more inclusive of a wider range of partisan support. Furthermore, group 2 MPs were315
more likely for to vote to leave the EU, than groups 1 and 3. Notably, it was also found this group316
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Graph 3. MPs network of communication based from actions during the referendum campaign coloured by modularity. Created
using OpenOrd Layout. Each MP (displayed as nodes) has been identified by the three modularity classes. The size of the
Nodes and Labels are dependent on their importance within the network (Eigenvector).
contained a number of SNP and other third party representatives in the dataset. This inclusion of third-317
party MPs, despite their support for remain, is interesting. It would go someway to suggest that MPs from318
smaller remain supporting parties actively tried to cross the boundaries of the network set by Labour and319
Conservatives in an attempt to reach out or potentially debate with leave supporting MPs. This largely320
explains their high degree of communication and inclusion within this group. Similarly, there are a321
number of Labour and Conservative MPs who overall supported remaining in the EU, but were using322
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Table 3
MPs ranked by Eigenvector-Centrality
MP Eigenvector-Centrality Party EU ref voting intention Modularity group
Boris Johnson 1 Conservative party Leave 2
Harriet Harman 0.932 Labour party Remain 3
Gisela Stuart 0.882 Labour party Leave 2
Priti Patel 0.879 Conservative party Leave 2
Jeremy Corbyn 0.787 Labour party Remain 3
Penny Mordaunt 0.764 Conservative party Leave 2
Angela Eagle 0.755 Labour party Remain 3
Sadiq Khan 0.686 Labour party Remain 3
John McDonnell 0.662 Labour party Remain 3
Andrea Leadsom 0.622 Conservative party Leave 2
John Mann 0.575 Labour party Leave 2
David Cameron 0.533 Conservative party Remain 1
Kate Hoey 0.525 Labour party Leave 2
Chuka Umunna 0.469 Labour party Remain 3
Ed Miliband 0.411 Labour party Remain 3
Ed Vaizey 0.405 Conservative party Remain 1
Caroline Lucas 0.381 Green party Remain 3
Tom Watson 0.379 Labour party Remain 3
Nadhim Zahawi 0.372 Conservative party Leave 2
Amber Rudd 0.35 Conservative party Remain 1
Nadine Dorries 0.349 Conservative party Leave 2
Steve Baker 0.348 Conservative party Leave 2
Mary Creagh 0.335 Labour party Remain 3
Hilary Benn 0.315 Labour party Remain 3
Sarah Wollaston 0.302 Conservative party Remain 1
Twitter to discuss the referendum with their campaign opponents. Therefore, this group signifies MPs323
who wish to leave the EU and also those more willing to cross party and ideological barriers to challenge324
the online campaign messages of the Leave side. This group, therefore, has a somewhat divergent split325
within it with a closely connected core group of leave supporters and a more marginal remain subset326
towards the outside of the group.327
4.4. Measuring prominence/importance amongst MPs328
While measuring the importance of a particular node within a network is important, there are a range329
of statistics that can be used. Here, we deployed the statistical algorithm Eigenvector-Centrality (Tarjan,330
1972).5 This produces a figure that can be used as measure of relative importance of every node across331
the overall structure of the network, rather than the groups within which they reside. This measure is332
useful for understanding the MPs who had the most prominence in the campaign amongst all MPs. In333
Graphs 3 and 4 each node is sized based upon Eigenvector-Centrality, with the bigger nodes having a334
relative importance across the network. This suggests when MPs are discussing particular issues there335
are individuals who hold significant prominence across the network in contrast to others.336
Table 3 lists all MPs with an Eigenvector-Centrality range of 1 to 0.3; with 1 being the most promi-337
nent/important MP within the network. These are listed alongside party, modularity class, and intention338
to vote. The table shows that MPs with significant pre-existing profile have a higher importance within339
the network. The list includes the leaders of the two main parties (Conservative and Labour), and senior340
5For further information on the ranking algorithms used, please see Hanneman and Riddle, 2005.
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government ministers. Furthermore, the characteristics of modularity groups who these MPs belong to,341
align closely, suggesting these are not only the most important, in terms of connections within the net-342
work, but also in terms of defining the groups in which they belong. It is no surprise perhaps that Boris343
Johnson was the most prominent MP in the data considering his high profile role in the Leave campaign.344
What is perhaps more surprising is the position of the Conservative Party leaders. PM David Cameron345
was not a particular prominent figure in the data, below some backbench MPs such as John Mann, and346
below opposition leader Jeremy Corbyn. This is interesting in that Corbyn was heavily criticised for347
his apparently lacklustre campaigning during the referendum (Wilson, 2016; Dugdale 2017) and yet, on348
Twitter at least, he was more central than David Cameron. However, in other ways this is not so surpris-349
ing. Corbyn’s prominence and successful leadership campaign is often attributed to a savvy use of social350
media (Prince, 2016) and so centrality in online networks might be expected and, therefore, replicated351
within the network of MPs. Our data implies that this is due to them having a greater retweet ratio to352
other MPs. However, without further analysis, which is beyond the scope of this paper, these data alone353
cannot be used to understand why these particular MPs are so prominent within the network. There are354
further, indications from the way MPs are grouped to suggest that politicians within smaller networks,355
such as the Leave side, are more supportive of each-other irrespective of party when compared to the356
larger Remain side. This would explain the unexpected importance of some members and, moreover,357
suggests that social media is contributing to the erosion of strict hierarchies of importance based on358
status. Several relative unknowns (at the time) were prominent in the data in a way that they were not in359
the press coverage of Brexit (Harmer et al., 2016) e.g. Steve Baker (Conservative, Leave, MP).360
5. Discussion and conclusions361
The social media data deployed here has important methodological implications for research on politi-362
cians’ interpersonal relationships. It provides a window into their overarching communication networks363
without the requirement of accessing private emails, letters, or spoken conversations that previously364
were difficult to gain. In this article, we have used this window to create a greater understanding of how365
MPs have communicated over the duration of the European referendum campaign to find which MPs366
are talking to each other, and the contents of this communication. Although here we focus on a specific,367
(and, as demonstrated, rather unusual campaign), this has implications more broadly for understanding368
political elite communication networks.369
The referendum campaign was a rare event in UK politics. Political representatives from a range of370
political parties campaigned together, providing potentially fertile ground for, inter-party linkages. This371
was a significant opportunity therefore to test whether partisanship remains even on such a divisive372
topic. One the whole, it does seem that partisanship held up, particularly when considering groups 1 and373
2 in our modularity analysis. Essentially, the Remain campaign split into two ‘camps’ largely divided374
by party (and more specifically, the two largest parties). These groupings suggest two things: Firstly,375
a majority of Remain supporters, regardless of the shared and important cause in question here, still376
sought to campaign along party lines; Secondly, party politics is being replicated and possibly even377
reinforced online rather than being eroded as early scholars in this area predicted (Ward & Gibson,378
1998; Margolis & Resnick, 2001). This chimes with wider findings about online polarisation primarily379
existing amongst the most political active and engaged groups within society rather than regular voters380
(Prior, 2013: Pacewicz, 2016).381
However, partisanship was less influential between MPs within group 2. This group, can be sum-382
marised as comprising the vast bulk of the Leave supporting MPs with a sprinkling of Remain MPs who383
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wished to interact or debate the subject. Therefore, the Leavers within the group are the exception to the384
theory regarding UK MPs and partisanship. It seems that for these MPs the cause of leaving the EU was385
more important to them than party attachment, and they were happy to welcome those who were not in386
their party into the fold. This would partly explain why some MPs such as Gisela Stuart, Steve Baker,387
and Kate Hoey, hardly prominent figures normally, had a significantly increased importance within MPs’388
Twitter networks. It is possible that the rarity of Labour Leavers increased their currency as figureheads389
for this position in the debate, nevertheless, it underlines that they were as firmly part of the group being390
tagged and re-tweeted often by other Leavers, regardless of party affiliation. Overall then, MPs who391
supported Leave banded together much more effectively than their respective Remain supporters who392
seemingly put party ahead of the Remain cause.393
The findings here have important implications for campaigning more broadly. The Leave campaign394
seemingly coalesced around their cause, regardless of party loyalties. This cannot be said to the same395
extent for the Remain camp. Lessons could be learnt here for Remain supporters, and particularly if the396
prospect of a ‘People’s Vote’ (i.e. a second referendum on the terms of withdrawing versus the option397
of remaining) comes to fruition. Rather than replicating the fractious Remain campaign, which some398
have suggested spilled over into their campaign communications (Behr, 2016), if they were to stand any399
chance of winning this second vote, the evidence here suggests that they should at least project a more400
unified cross-party front.401
In terms of our second area of concern (intra-party networks), when assessing whether social media402
may be eroding traditional party hierarchies, there is some evidence here to suggest it does in certain403
circumstances and on an issue basis lending support to Del Valle and Borge’s (2017) idea of the emer-404
gence of online brokers and new influences in parliamentary networks. Several less prominent MPs were405
central within their networks. Harriet Harman, although a clearly prominent figure in the Labour Party,406
was a backbencher at the time and yet was second only the Boris Johnson in terms of eigenvector cen-407
trality here. Several backbench MPs attained a higher centrality than Prime Minister David Cameron,408
who could well be considered the ‘face’ of the Remain campaign and yet was not particularly central409
considering his status. This would suggest that within issue-based, social networks, party leaders play a410
less significant role than their offline position would suggest. It seems not only does social media allow411
for a greater level of independence away from core party lines, but that within MPs networks, traditional412
hierarchies have less influence in online debates.413
In short, the unusual EU campaign offered an opportunity to create a greater understanding of the414
nature of elite communication networks. It showed that the expectations of strong levels of divide on a415
single issue across political parties can be seen on social media communication, and while the majority416
of MPs networks remained based on expected party lines, small groups of cross party MPs, who share a417
common cause, may can be found banding together in supportive alliances. Arguably, social media has418
therefore widened the potential for inter-party connections that don’t readily exist offline. Furthermore,419
the study indicates even stronger potential for disruptive intra-party impacts, where social media can420
allow politicians to be prominent online outside of traditional formal party structures. However, partly421
because of the atypical nature of the case study here, means that to deepen our understanding of parlia-422
mentary communicative networks further research is required in at least three respects: Firstly, whilst423
our results provided a snapshot, the monitoring of the parliamentary communicative networks over time424
would help trace shifts in connections and the drivers of change (especially across parliamentary ses-425
sions). Three years on from the referendum, it would be useful to see whether the networks outlined here426
have become further entrenched and whether they have started spill-over into other areas. For instance,427
how far the intra-party networks around 2019 Conservative Party leadership contest reflect some of the428
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internal divides we detected in 2016. Secondly, study is also required around the everyday, and some-429
times less polarised, issues of parliamentary business, where there might be scope for more inter-party430
cooperation and communication. The more routine and less partisan driven issues might be expected to431
foster more inter-party communication networks. Finally, our research has concentrated on one platform432
(Twitter), the most public of the social media communication networks. It would be interesting to com-433
pare these networks with other social media platforms, for example, the rise of the relatively closed world434
of WhatsApp discussion groups within the parliamentary parties (Elgot, 2017). These private networks435
have become more central to intra-party discussions, in particular, but raise considerable methodological436
and ethical challenges for researchers in how to access and study them.437
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